Suchergebnisse

Das Währungsmanagement als Teilgebiet des internationalen Finanzmanagements beschäftigt sich mit der Frage, wie die währungsbezogene Zusammensetzung von Zahlungsströmen in Unternehmen beeinflusst werden kann. Zielsetzung ist die Optimierung von Fremdwährungspositionen unter Ertrags- und Risikoaspekten. Nach einer grundlegenden Einführung werden die zentralen Begriffe Wechselkursrisiko, Hedging und Spekulation erläutert und Instrumente zur Verfolgung von Hedging- und/oder Spekulationszielen auf Devisenmärkten vorgestellt. Das theoretisch fundierte Wissen wird anhand einer Vielzahl konkreter Kurssicherungsprobleme vertieft. Diese reichen vom isolierten Hedging mit Forwards oder Futures bei sicheren oder unsicheren Fremdwährungspositionen über den simultanen Einsatz von Forwards und Optionen bis zu sequentiellen Entscheidungsproblemen. Jedes Kapitel wird durch Fragen und Übungsaufgaben ergänzt. Neu in der 3. Auflage Das Lehrbuch wurde umfassend überarbeitet und erweitert, insbesondere die Ausführungen zu internationalen Paritätsbeziehungen, Hedging- und Spekulationsmöglichkeiten. Der Inhalt Devisenmarkt und Wechselkurs Grundlagen unternehmerischen Währungsmanagements Analyse konkreter Absicherungsprobleme Der Autor Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Breuer ist Inhaber des Lehrstuhls für Betriebswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Betriebliche Finanzwirtschaft, an der RWTH Aachen.

Die CD enthält die Muster und Formulare des Buches mit ausführlichen Erläuterungen.

We analyze the role of different kinds of primary and secondary market interventions for the government's goal to maximize its revenues from public bond issuances. Some of these interventions can be thought of as characteristics of a "primary dealer system". After all, we see that a primary dealer system with a restricted number of participants may be useful in case of only restricted competition among sufficiently heterogeneous market makers. We further show that minimum secondary market turnover requirements for primary dealers with respect to bond sales seem to be in general more adequate than the definition of maximum bid-ask-spreads or minimum turnover requirements with respect to bond purchases. Moreover, official price management operations are not able to completely substitute for a system of primary dealers. Finally it should be noted that there is in general no reason for monetary compensations to primary dealers since they already possess some privileges with respect to public bond auction.

We analyze the role of different kinds of primary and secondary market interventions for the government's goal to maximize its revenues from public bond issuances. Some of these interventions can be thought of as characteristics of a "primary dealer system". After all, we see that a primary dealer system with a restricted number of participants may be useful in case of only restricted competition among sufficiently heterogeneous market makers. We further show that minimum secondary market turnover requirements for primary dealers with respect to bond sales seem to be in general more adequate than the definition of maximum bid-ask-spreads or minimum turnover requirements with respect to bond purchases. Moreover, official price management operations are not able to completely substitute for a system of primary dealers. Finally it should be noted that there is in general no reason for monetary compensations to primary dealers since they already possess some privileges with respect to public bond auction.

We analyze the role of different kinds of primary and secondary market interventions for the government's goal to maximize its revenues from public bond issuances. Some of these interventions can be thought of as characteristics of a primary dealer system. After all, we see that a primary dealer system with a restricted number of participants may be useful in case of only restricted competition among sufficiently heterogeneous market makers. We further show that minimum secondary market turnover requirements for primary dealers with respect to bond sales seem to be in general more adequate than the definition of maximum bid-ask-spreads or minimum turnover requirements with respect to bond purchases. Moreover, official price management operations are not able to completely substitute for a system of primary dealers. Finally it should be noted that there is in general no reason for monetary compensations to primary dealers since they already possess some privileges with respect to public bond auction.